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Passkeys Explained - The Complete Guide to Passwordless Authentication 2024

Authentication Guide

Passkeys Explained

READING TIME
18 minutes
DIFFICULTY
Beginner to Intermediate
STATUS
Production Ready
DEFINITION
Passkeys are a passwordless authentication method based on FIDO2/WebAuthn standards. They use public-key cryptography and biometrics to provide phishing-resistant, frictionless login.
The House Key Analogy: Passwords are like a secret code that anyone who learns it can use. Passkeys are like a unique physical key—even if someone knows your house exists, they can’t get in without your specific key. And modern Passkeys are like a key that only works when YOU hold it (via biometric verification).

Passkeys represent the biggest shift in authentication since passwords were invented:

The Password ProblemThe Passkey Solution
Users reuse passwords across sitesUnique cryptographic key per site
Passwords can be phishedCryptographically bound to domain
Passwords are stored on serversOnly public key stored, private never leaves device
Users forget passwordsBiometric unlock, nothing to remember
Password reset is expensiveNo passwords to reset

Industry Adoption (2024):

  • ✅ Google, Apple, Microsoft — full Passkey support
  • ✅ GitHub, PayPal, eBay — consumer rollout
  • ✅ 1Password, Dashlane, Bitwarden — Passkey management
  • ✅ Okta, Auth0, Azure AD — enterprise integration

Passkeys use asymmetric (public-key) cryptography:

1

Registration

Device generates a unique key pair. Private key stays on device (protected by biometrics). Public key is sent to the website.

2

Authentication

Website sends a random challenge. Device signs the challenge with the private key (after biometric verification). Website verifies signature with stored public key.

3

Verification

If signature is valid, the user is authenticated. No password transmitted. No shared secret on the server.

The key insight: Passkeys are cryptographically bound to the website’s origin.

Example: You register a Passkey for bank.com
Legitimate site (bank.com):
→ Browser confirms origin is "bank.com"
→ Passkey for "bank.com" is used
→ Authentication succeeds ✅
Phishing site (bank-secure.com):
→ Browser confirms origin is "bank-secure.com"
→ No Passkey exists for this domain
→ Authentication fails ❌
→ Phishing attack blocked automatically

The browser enforces origin checking at the protocol level. Users can’t be tricked into using their Passkey on a fake site, even if it looks identical.

Device-Bound Passkeys stay on one device and cannot be exported.

Examples:

  • Hardware security keys (YubiKey, Titan Key)
  • Some enterprise deployments

Pros:

  • ✅ Highest security — key never leaves hardware
  • ✅ Resistant to remote attacks
  • ✅ Preferred for high-security use cases

Cons:

  • ❌ Lost device = lost access (need backup)
  • ❌ Can’t use the same Passkey on multiple devices
  • ❌ Less convenient for consumers
AspectPassword + MFAPasskey
Phishing resistance❌ Codes can be phished in real-time✅ Cryptographically impossible
User experience😐 Type password, wait for code, enter code😊 One touch (Face ID/fingerprint)
Password resets❌ 30-40% of help desk calls✅ None — nothing to forget
Credential stuffing❌ Reused passwords are vulnerable✅ Unique key per site
Server breach impact❌ Hashed passwords can be cracked✅ Public keys are useless to attackers
Account recoveryVia email (another password)Via synced credential manager

Passkeys provide better security AND better UX. This is rare in security.

The WebAuthn JavaScript API:

// REGISTRATION: Create a new Passkey
const credential = await navigator.credentials.create({
publicKey: {
challenge: new Uint8Array([/* server-generated challenge */]),
rp: {
name: "Example Corp",
id: "example.com"
},
user: {
id: new Uint8Array([/* unique user id */]),
name: "jane@example.com",
displayName: "Jane Doe"
},
pubKeyCredParams: [
{ alg: -7, type: "public-key" }, // ES256
{ alg: -257, type: "public-key" } // RS256
],
authenticatorSelection: {
residentKey: "preferred",
userVerification: "preferred"
},
timeout: 60000
}
});
// Send credential.response to server for storage
// AUTHENTICATION: Use an existing Passkey
const assertion = await navigator.credentials.get({
publicKey: {
challenge: new Uint8Array([/* server-generated challenge */]),
rpId: "example.com",
userVerification: "preferred",
timeout: 60000
}
});
// Send assertion.response to server for verification

Don’t implement WebAuthn from scratch. Use these:

LanguageLibrary
JavaScriptSimpleWebAuthn, @github/webauthn-json
Pythonpy_webauthn, fido2
Node.jsSimpleWebAuthn, fido2-lib
Gogo-webauthn/webauthn
Rubywebauthn-ruby
Javajava-webauthn-server
// Enable Passkeys in Auth0
// Dashboard → Authentication → Database → Password Policy
// Enable "Passkey" authentication
// Or via Management API:
const auth0 = new ManagementClient({...});
await auth0.connections.update(
{ id: connectionId },
{ options: { passkey: { enabled: true } } }
);

Auth0 Passkeys Documentation →

Current state: Password + MFA
Add Passkey as optional login method
Users can register Passkeys while keeping password

Actions:

  • Enable Passkey authentication in your IdP/app
  • Encourage (don’t force) users to register Passkeys
  • Measure adoption rate
Login flow:
1. Check if user has registered Passkey
2. If yes → Offer Passkey login first
3. If no → Fall back to password
4. Prompt password users to register Passkey

Actions:

  • Make Passkey the prominent login option
  • Show password as secondary option
  • Implement “add Passkey” prompts post-login
For privileged users/sensitive apps:
├── Require Passkey registration
├── Disable password authentication
└── Hardware keys for admin access

Actions:

  • Require Passkey for admin accounts
  • Mandate for new employee onboarding
  • Maintain break-glass recovery process
Target state:
├── All users authenticate with Passkeys
├── No passwords to phish, leak, or reset
├── Hardware keys for privileged access
└── Password only for legacy edge cases
1

User Initiates

”Add Passkey” button in security settings or post-login prompt.

2

Browser Prompt

System dialog appears asking to create a Passkey for this site.

3

Biometric Verification

Face ID, Touch ID, Windows Hello, or security key touch.

4

Confirmation

Passkey saved. User can now sign in without a password.

1. User navigates to login page
2. Clicks "Sign in with Passkey" (or autofill suggestion appears)
3. Biometric prompt (Face ID, Touch ID, etc.)
4. Authenticated! (< 3 seconds total)

No typing. No waiting for SMS. No copying codes.

Problem: User loses all devices with synced Passkeys.

Solutions:

ApproachImplementation
Multiple devicesEncourage registering Passkeys on multiple devices
Backup codesProvide one-time recovery codes at registration
Hardware key backupRegister a security key stored in safe location
Identity verificationHelp desk with strong identity proofing

Problem: Can’t use personal Passkey on shared computer.

Solutions:

  • Use security key (portable, works anywhere)
  • “Hybrid authentication” — scan QR with phone
  • Maintain password fallback for edge cases

Problem: Apple Passkeys don’t sync to Android, and vice versa.

Solutions:

  • Third-party password managers (1Password, Bitwarden) sync cross-platform
  • Register Passkeys on each platform
  • Use hardware security key as universal backup
PlatformPasskey Support
Chrome✅ Full support (synced via Google account)
Safari✅ Full support (synced via iCloud Keychain)
Edge✅ Full support (synced via Microsoft account)
Firefox✅ Support for hardware keys, synced Passkeys coming
iOS✅ Full support (Safari, supported apps)
Android✅ Full support (Chrome, supported apps)
Windows✅ Windows Hello, hardware keys
macOS✅ Touch ID, hardware keys
AttackProtection LevelHow
Phishing✅ CompleteOrigin binding at protocol level
Credential stuffing✅ CompleteUnique key per site
Server breach✅ CompleteOnly public keys stored
Keyloggers✅ CompleteNo typing involved
SIM swapping✅ CompleteNo phone numbers involved
MFA fatigue✅ CompleteNo push notifications
AttackNotes
Device theftBiometrics help, but device access is a risk
Malware on deviceAdvanced malware could intercept authentication
Cloud account compromiseSynced Passkeys only as secure as the sync account
Social engineeringUsers could be tricked into actions post-authentication

WebAuthn Protocol

Deep dive into the WebAuthn specification and implementation details. WebAuthn Guide →

Passwordless Patterns

Explore passwordless authentication strategies beyond Passkeys. Passwordless Guide →

MFA Best Practices

Compare Passkeys with other MFA methods and plan your strategy. MFA Guide →


Go Passwordless

Explore our complete passwordless authentication resources and implementation guides.