Skip to content

Kerberos Authentication Flow

The Kerberos Authentication Flow is a masterclass in cryptographic protocol engineering. It is designed to solve a single, critical problem: How can a user prove their identity to a service across a hostile network without ever revealing their password? The “Flow” achieves this through a series of “Zero-Knowledge” exchanges mediated by the Key Distribution Center (KDC). By breaking the authentication process into distinct phases—Initial Identity Proof (AS), General Session Authorization (TGS), and Specific Service Verification (AP)—Kerberos creates a highly resilient environment where compromises are contained and identity signals are cryptographically immutable.

KERB-FLOW

Exchange Logic
Core Mission
Sovereign Identity Orchestration. Managing the cryptographic sequence required to transform a user's initial login into a verifiable service ticket for any authorized resource in the domain.
Like the Security Escort Service: Imagine you are visiting a top-secret government facility. You don't just walk into the lab (The Service). First, you go to the main gate (The AS) and present your ID. They don't give you a key to the lab; they give you a "General Security Escort" (The TGT). When you want to enter the lab, your escort takes you to the lab supervisor (The TGS), who checks your escort's credentials and issues you a "Lab-Specific Access Pass" (The Service Ticket). Only then do you present that pass to the lab door. At no point did you have to give everyone your master key.
Domain Login / Integrated Windows Auth (IWA) / Multi-Tier Service Access

The Kerberos flow is composed of three distinct “Ceremonies,” each protecting a different layer of the identity stack.

StageTransactionStrategic ResponsibilityArtifact
I. AuthenticationAS-REQ / AS-REPVerifying the human/machine at the door.TGT
II. AuthorizationTGS-REQ / TGS-REPGranting access to a specific service.Service Ticket (ST)
III. ApplicationAP-REQ / AP-REPProving identity to the destination app.Authenticator

Every Kerberos interaction follows a rigorous cryptographic sequence designed to eliminate the risk of credential theft.

sequenceDiagram
    participant Client
    participant KDC_AS as KDC: Auth Service
    participant KDC_TGS as KDC: Ticket Service
    participant Service as Target App
    
    note over Client: Initial Login (Password Input)
    Client->>KDC_AS: AS-REQ (Encrypted Timestamp)
    KDC_AS->>KDC_AS: Verify Timestamp with User Key
    KDC_AS-->>Client: AS-REP (Issue TGT)
    
    note over Client: Request specific App Access
    Client->>KDC_TGS: TGS-REQ (Present TGT + Authenticator)
    KDC_TGS-->>Client: TGS-REP (Issue Service Ticket)
    
    note over Client: Present Ticket to App
    Client->>Service: AP-REQ (Present ST)
    Service->>Service: Decrypt ST & Verify Identity
    Service-->>Client: Success (Session Start)
1

Pre-Authenticate & Establish

The client sends an **AS-REQ** containing a timestamp encrypted with their password hash. The KDC decrypts it; if it succeeds and the time is current, the user is proven authentic. The KDCs response (**AS-REP**) includes the **Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT)**, encrypted so only the KDC can read it later.

2

Authorize the specific

When the client needs a resource, it initiates a **TGS-REQ**. It presents its TGT along with a fresh "Authenticator." The KDC verifies the TGT, checks the user's group memberships in the PAC, and issues a **Service Ticket** specifically bound to the Service Principal Name (SPN) of the destination app.

3

Validate & Verify

Finally, the client sends an **AP-REQ** to the application, carrying the Service Ticket. The application decrypts the ticket using its own secret key (shared with the KDC), extracts the user's identity, and establishes a local security context. The user is now "In."


Troubleshooting a Kerberos flow often requires inspecting the raw ticket traffic using network analysis tools.

Kerberos Traffic Pattern (Conceptual Example)

Section titled “Kerberos Traffic Pattern (Conceptual Example)”
Message TypeDirectionPrincipal InvolvedKey Required
AS-REQClient → KDCusername@REALMUser’s Password Hash.
TGS-REQClient → KDCkrbtgt/REALM@REALMKDC’s Master Key.
AP-REQClient → AppHTTP/web.example.comService’s Keytab.

Master the technical mechanics of ticket-based security and enterprise domain architecture.