Authorization Code Flow
Back-Channel Isolation
Section titled “Back-Channel Isolation”The Authorization Code Flow is the industry-standard implementation for secure server-side applications. It creates a robust, multi-stage “Handshake” that ensures sensitive tokens remain exclusively on your secure backend server, never touching the user’s browser in their final, usable form. By decoupling the initial user consent from the final token issuance, this flow effectively eliminates the risk of token exposure through browser history, referrer headers, or local storage.
The Handshake Sequence
Section titled “The Handshake Sequence”The security of the process depends on the strict separation of the Front-Channel (User’s Browser) and the Back-Channel (Server-to-Server).
sequenceDiagram
participant User
participant Browser
participant Server as Client Backend
participant IdP as Auth Server
User->>Browser: Click "Login"
Browser->>IdP: GET /authorize (state, redirect_uri)
IdP->>User: Authenticate & Consent
User-->>IdP: Approved
IdP-->>Browser: Redirect with code & state
Browser->>Server: Deliver code to Redirect URI
Server->>IdP: POST /token (code, client_secret)
IdP-->>Server: Issue Access Token
Initiate (Front-Channel)
The client redirects the user to the Authorization Server. Crucially, it includes a `state` parameter—a unique, unguessable string—that the server will return to prevent Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF).
Redirect (Front-Channel)
After consent, the Auth Server redirects the user back to the application with a short-lived "Authorization Code." At this stage, the Client Backend must verify that the `state` returned matches the one sent.
Exchange (Back-Channel)
The Backend performs a server-to-server POST request to the Token endpoint. It presents the Auth Code and its private `client_secret`. The Auth Server validates both and returns the final Access Token directly to the backend.
Parameter Governance Matrix
Section titled “Parameter Governance Matrix”Every parameter in an Authorization Code request is a critical security control. Improper configuration results in high-risk vulnerabilities.
Strategic Parameter Grid
Section titled “Strategic Parameter Grid”| Parameter | Purpose | Strategic Requirement |
|---|---|---|
state | CSRF Protection. | Unique per-session, unguessable nonce. |
redirect_uri | Delivery Target. | Must be pre-registered; exact match. |
client_secret | Backend Auth. | NEVER expose to the frontend/browser. |
code | Swap Key. | Single-use only; 5-10 minute lifespan. |
Technical Implementation Guide
Section titled “Technical Implementation Guide”Implementing the exchange requires a robust, error-handling HTTP client on your backend.
Token Exchange (JavaScript Example)
Section titled “Token Exchange (JavaScript Example)”// Server-Side Token Exchange Implementationasync function exchangeAuthCode(code, state) { // 1. Verify CSRF state from session if (state !== session.oauth_state) throw new Error("State mismatch");
// 2. Perform back-channel POST const response = await fetch("https://auth.example.com/token", { method: "POST", body: new URLSearchParams({ grant_type: "authorization_code", code: code, redirect_uri: process.env.REDIRECT_URI, client_id: process.env.CLIENT_ID, client_secret: process.env.CLIENT_SECRET // Secure env var }) });
return await response.json();}OAuth Implementation Guides
Section titled “OAuth Implementation Guides”Master the technical details of the Authorization Code flow and its extensions.
PKCE Enforcement
Hardening the Auth Code flow for mobile and single-page apps (SPAs).
Attack Mitigations
Specific defenses against code injection and redirect URI manipulation.
Token Lifecycle
Managing the storage and rotation of tokens received during the exchange.
OpenID Connect
Adding identity layers (ID Tokens) to the standard OAuth code flow.
Next Steps
Section titled “Next Steps”- Explore State Management Patterns for resilient CSRF protection.
- Review Confidential vs. Public Clients to understand secret requirements.
- Check Authorization Server Metadata for automating endpoint discovery.